Coping with stress through 'decisional control' -positioning oneself in a multifaceted stressing situation so as to minimize the likelihood of an untoward event -is modelled within a tree-structure scenario, whose architecture hierarchically nests elements of varying threat. Analytic and simulation platforms quantify the game-like interplay of cognitive demands and threat reduction. When elements of uncertainty enter the theoretical structure, specifically at more subordinate levels of the hierarchy, the mathematical expectation of threat is particularly exacerbated. As quantified in this model, the exercise of decisional control is demonstrably related to reduction in expected threat (the minimum correlation across comprehensive parameter settings being :55). Disclosure of otherwise intractable stress-coping subtleties, endowed by the quantitative translation of verbal premises, is underscored. Formalization of decisional stress control is seen to usher in linkages to augmenting formal developments from fields of cognitive science, preference and choice modelling, and nonlinear dynamical systems theory. Model-prescribed empirical consequences are stipulated.
Introduction
Human dealings with psychological stress are pervaded by cognition-intensive coping (Holahan, Holahan, Moos, Brennan, & Schutte, 2005; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006) . A prominent and ubiquitous form of such coping is 'decisional control' (Averill, 1973; Thompson, 1981) . Decisional control entails positioning oneself in a multifaceted stressing situation so as to minimize the probability of an untoward event, such as the occurrence of physical danger or discomfort, or an abrasive social interchange (Lees & Neufeld, 1999) . Implicit in decisional control is increased accessibility to less threatening options, should an effective decision be made. As the number of options increases, the likelihood of being barred from the one carrying minimal threat decreases (assuming no bias in availability; Neufeld & Paterson, 1989) . Increased, however, is the number of predictive judgements required to ascertain the anticipation (evaluation) of potential encounters (i.e., floor assignments) remains operative, even when choice cannot be exercised (condition U). To describe a scenario, choice conditions are ordered from higher to lower nesting. Thus, free choice of facility with deferred assignment of floor would be denoted CU (Morrison et al., 1988; Neufeld, 1982 ; see also Averill, 1979; Thompson, 1981) .
Delineation of decisional-control attributes
Decisional control/threat reducibility is defined as the probability of access to the situation's least threatening option, Pr(t 1 ); information-processing demand as potential outcome set size (OSS); and degree of objective threat as the mathematical expectation of threat, E(t), attending the exercise of decisional control under prevailing choice constraints. (Note. A related decisional situation attribute, unpredictability of threatened events, Var(m), is formally defined and discussed in the online Appendix, http://publish.uwo.ca/~mshanah).
Decisional control and threat reducibility
Given selection-outcome contingency, more pre-emptive control can be exerted with more available choices (Paterson & Neufeld, 1995) . Available decisional control is defined here as the number of possible responses the DM can make -response set size (RSS). Under a maximizing strategy, RSS correlates perfectly with the probability of access to the least threatening option, Pr(t 1 ). The relationship between the two quantities is expressed for a first-or second-order scenario with p bins and q elements, or P bin sets, p bins per set, and q elements:
Information-processing demands
Information-processing demands are defined as a potential OSS. For p bins and q elements in each bin, for example, there are pq possible outcomes under conditions CC, CU, UC, and UU; q under NC and NU; p under CN and UN, and 1 for NN. The assumed maximizing strategy centres on threats with non-negligible aversiveness, hence exhaustive processing of potential encounters (OSS) is assumed, even when RSS , OSS. In condition CU, for instance, the bin with the lowest t i value (in this case t 1 ) would be ascertained and chosen.
As a measure of information-processing demands, OSS allows for comparison with threat reducibility, potentially revealing implications for individual differences in decisional-control predilection and amenability (Morrison et al., 1988) .
2.2.3. Mathematical expectation of threat E(t) conveys the amount of threat prevailing in the aftermath of exploiting decisional control as availed by the governing choice conditions. It incorporates the product of the probability of access to the least threatening option and the value for this lowest threat level, with the products of all other probabilities and corresponding threat levels, altogether yielding threat expectation (expected probability of an untoward event).
Sample derivation of quantities
A narrative of the derivation of the quantities for a first-order scenario is provided below. Quantities for RSS, Pr(t 1 ), and OSS for a representative sample of 10 scenarios are presented in Table 1 ; corresponding expressions for E(t) are presented in Table 2 . Note that these 10 expressions comprehensively depict different general forms of equations for E(t) among first-and second-order scenarios.
Scenario NC
Prðt 1 Þ ¼ 1=p;
RSS ¼ q; Table 2; OSS ¼ q:
E(t) is stated in
For NC, Pr(t 1 ) reflects the probability of external assignment (no choice -N) of the bin containing t 1 . The RSS reflects the number of elements available for selection under the free-choice (C) condition. The expected threat derivation involves the use of the hypergeometric distribution (Patil & Joshi, 1968 ; specifics of current implementation are available in the online Appendix, http://publish.uwo.ca/~mshanah, together with a narrative for a sample second-order scenario, UCN). There are q elements in the assigned bin, hence the value of OSS.
Simulation methods
For the first-order scenarios, nine bin-element scenario structures were available as the cross product of the three choice conditions, C, U, and N, at the element-nesting bin level of the structure, with C, U, and N at the nested-element level. The number of Cartesian product elements entailing choice conditions rose to 27 for the second-order scenarios. The mathematical computing platform MATLAB (version 7.2.0.232 [R2006a] ) was used to calculate values of decisional-control scenario attributes and their associations. The input for an individual scenario structure comprised a value for a p and q pair, or a P, p, and q triplet, a value for t 1 and for the increment between t i values. 
Note. C, free choice over constituents of the associated tier; U, constituent assignment, with uncertainty as to assignment, pending tier entry; N, constituent assignment, with foreknowledge of assigned constituent.
This led to a pq-or Ppq-tuple vector of t i values, and computation of the scenario's attribute quantities of Pr(t 1 ), E(t), and OSS. Two extensive lists exhausted possible arrangements of p and q, and P, p and q values such that, respectively:
pq # 100; p; q $ 2; p; q [ N;
Ppq # 100; P; p; q $ 2; P; p; q [ N:
These constraints generated 283 pairs of p and q values and 324 triplets of P, p, and q values. The number of runs totalled 2,830 for the set of nine first-order scenario structures, and 1,944 for the set of 27 second-order scenario structures.
1 Table 2 . Expected threat E(t) for 10 representative scenarios Scenario architecture Formula for E(t)
Hðq 2 1; pq 2 2; pq 2 i 0 ; q 2 1Þ·t i 0
HðPp 2 1;Ppq 2 2;Ppq 2 i 0 ;Pp 2 1Þ·t i 0
HðPq 2 1; Ppq 2 2; Ppq 2 i 0 ; Pq 2 1Þ· 1 q þð1 2 HðPq 2 1;
Hðp 2 1; Ppq 2 2; Ppq 2 i 0 ; p 2 1Þ·t i 0 a The term t i 0 denotes the mean of pq 2 1 values of t i 0 , in the composition of E(t) for NN and CU, and the mean of Ppq 2 1 values of t i 0 , in the composition of E(t) for NNN, CCU, and CNU; see the note to Table 1 for definitions of C, U, and N; P, number of bin sets; p, number of bins nested in bin sets; q, number of elements nested in bins. b The expression in braces reduces to Pp=ðPpq 2 1Þ. As in the text, expansion conveys a potentially informative 'interplay' among constituent terms: the probability of t i 0 being in the bin containing t 1 , (q 2 1Þ=ðPpq 2 1), is multiplied by the probability of t i 0 's assignment, given both its location in t 1 's bin and non-assignment of t 1 , 1=ðq 2 1Þ, plus the probability of being in a bin other than t 1 's bin, given non-assignment of t 1 , (Pp 2 1)q/(Ppq 2 1), multiplied by the probability of t i 0 being assigned, given its location outside t 1 's bin, 1/q. Similar considerations apply to other listed E(t) formulae.
Specific analyses
4.1. Pr(t 1 ) as an index of mathematical expectation of threat, E(t) There is computational and empirical evidence that the probability of access to the least threatening option Pr(t 1 ) can serve as an approximation to the mathematical expectation of threat E(t) (Kukde & Neufeld, 1994; Morrison et al., 1988) . Pr(t 1 ) is calculated as the inverse of the product of the number of items at all tiers with constraint on choice. In the case of CCU, for example, Pr(t 1 ) is simply 1/q, q being the number of elements available in the U condition. Pr(t 1 ) is thus fairly straightforward to calculate, and is inversely proportional to q.
The calculation of E(t) for CCU is more involved and less readily apparent:
(see note 'a' of Table 2 ). For other scenario architectures (e.g., UCN, CNU), a computing aid is unequivocally required to evaluate E(t), especially to implement the hypergeometric distribution. However, Pr(t 1 ) remains straightforward to calculate, as the inverse of at most the product of two (first-order structure) or three (second-order structure) natural numbers. Finally, Pr(t 1 ) is a scaled value of RSS, the index of available decisional control. Decisional control, also termed threat reducibility, ought by definition to impact the mathematical expectation of threat. Our first analysis was designed to quantify this association, and was directed towards examining Pr(t 1 ) as a tractable, tenable surrogate for E(t).
Results
Equivalence of the correlations across all t 1 and Dt i values accorded with the 'scalar effect' of level of threat, such that it had no influence on correlations within specific values of the scenario-structure parameters p, q, or P, p, q. The result is consequential to each set of t i values forming an intended discrete uniform distribution, whereby the contour of structurewise E(t)s remains stable. (A non-trivial by-product of this observation is its attestation to computational accuracy of the simulations.)
The average correlation between Pr(t 1 ) and E(t) for the first-order scenarios was 2 .7698, with a standard deviation (computed across combinations of scenario-structure parameter values) of .1045. Values ranged from 2 .5894 (p ¼ 11, q ¼ 9), to 2 .9527 (p ¼ q ¼ 2). Average correlation for the second-order scenarios was 2 .6851, the standard deviation being .0753. The weakest correlation was 2 .55 (
The comprehensive examination of the Pr(t 1 ) to E(t) correlation supports, if imperfectly, the negative correspondence of Pr(t 1 ) with the benchmark threat value E(t). Even the weakest specific correlation, r ¼ 2:5500, indicates that Pr(t 1 ) accounts for 30% of the variance in E(t). If the descriptors of central tendency are used, the average correlations indicate that Pr(t 1 ) in general accounts for 59% and 47% of the variance in E(t) in first-and second-order scenarios, respectively. The difference between the weakest and strongest value suggests the association varies with regions of the scenario-structure parameters. In the present case, the strongest associations accompanied the lowest values for p, q, and P, p, and q; the weakest associations accompanied parameter values equal to or approaching the current upper limit of their product, with approximate evenness of these values across tiers of the hierarchical scenario structure.
To aid in interpreting the simulation analysis, a brief illustration will be given in the context of the hypothetical mental health example presented earlier. In the case of Pr(t 1 ), as a negative indicator of E(t), the implication is that by and large it is desirable to maximize Pr(t 1 ) by reducing the number of potential encounters at decision nodes without free choice, because Pr(t 1 ) is the inverse of the product of the potential encounter set size at nodes with external assignment. Put simply from the individual's perspective, one is likely to have more impact on reducing threat if there are fewer items that could be externally assigned at each hierarchy level. There must of course be free choice (C) at a minimum of one node in the scenario for decisional control to be available at all. As an example, when choosing among several facilities each with several in-patient floor units within a CN decision structure, the ability to select a facility to minimize likelihood of relapse would be enhanced if the number of floors per facility (or q elements at the node with N (no choice)) were minimized, thus maximizing Pr(t 1 ).
Associations of information-processing demands (OSS) with threat reducibility
Pr(t 1 ) and expected threat, E(t) Information-processing demands are theorized to play a role in stress negotiation, especially under the present maximizing strategy, where options are exhaustively evaluated. From earlier sample calculations (Neufeld, 1999b) , a moderate correlation between Pr(t 1 ) and OSS is expected as reflecting some association between threat reducibility and number of potential outcomes; a low moderate negative correlation between E(t) and OSS is predicted. As such, expected threat would be projected to increase somewhat with a decrease number of potential outcomes.
Results
The average correlation between Pr(t 1 ) and OSS for the first-order scenarios was .4452, with a standard deviation of .0168. Values ranged from .4267 (p ¼ 10, q ¼ 10), to .4875 (p ¼ q ¼ 2). The average correlation for the second-order scenarios was .4359, the standard deviation being .0139. The weakest correlation was .4082
Values for OSS evidently are moderately correlated with Pr(t 1 ), within a relatively narrow range, indicating a robust moderate correlation. The maximum and minimum associations are identified with patterns of parameter values closely related to those for Pr(t 1 ) and E(t), above.
For the first-order scenarios, the average correlation between OSS and E(t) was 2 .2915, with a standard deviation of .0661. Values ranged from 2 .1873 (p ¼ q ¼ 10) to 2 .4173 (p ¼ q ¼ 2). The average for the second-order scenarios was 2 .2072, with a standard deviation of .0426. Values here ranged from 2 .1347 (
The association of OSS and E(t) in turn is decidedly present, albeit the weakest of the three inter-attribute associations. The range of associations is greater than that for Pr(t 1 ) and OSS; maximum and minimum associations again follow the configuration of parameter values attending maximum and minimum associations for the other pairs of attributes.
In terms of the mental health care example, it can simply be stated that a multiplicity of potential encounters (OSS) has some, though generally weaker, relation to reducing expected threat E(t) through decisional control. Specifically, a large total set of potential floor units on which the patient might be placed does not in itself confer much decisional-control advantage. The quantity OSS is calculated from the product of the set size for nodes in the C or U condition. Advantage accrues from maximizing the set size for nodes with free choice (C), as these also confer decisional control, and minimizing the set size for nodes with uncertainty (U), as these do not. For our mental health treatment example, assuming for illustration a 'CUN' scenario of P towns (C condition) nesting p facilities (U condition) nesting q floor units (N condition), optimizing the OSS components' effect on E(t) lies in maximizing P (towns) and minimizing p (facilities) per town.
Uncertainty and threat
Within this model architecture, uncertainty instigates certain processing exigencies amidst nevertheless curtailed threat reducibility. With uncertainty, there are increased potential outcomes to evaluate (relative to N), yet reduced information upon which to base a decision (again relative to N). Additionally, relative to C, there is hampered freedom of action to implement optimal choice. Thus, an examination of scenarios ranked from top to bottom in order of progressively increasing E(t), with a focus on condition U, speaks to uncertainty as compromising stress negotiation. Findings from these analyses are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 , for the first-and second-order scenarios, respectively.
Results and implications
The most salient adverse effect of uncertainty U on E(t) occurs when C at a superordinate level is followed by U at a subordinate level of the scenario structure. Simulations containing a CU ordering invariably have higher E(t) values than those with the equivalent number of conditions C, U, N, but with reverse ordering of C and U in the structure's hierarchy. Thus in the illustrative results of E(t) reported in Tables 3 and 4 , where the broad range from t 1 ¼ :1 to max t i ¼ :99 affords considerable scope for reducing stress by the exercise of decisional control, the advantage of any other arrangement involving at least one free choice (i.e., one C) over CU orderings is apparent. For example, UC generates an E(t) of .2242, as compared to CU's E(t) of .4625.
An informative comparison can be made for scenarios framed identically, except that N replaces U. In many of these comparisons, there is little or no effect of substituting N for U. For example, UCC and NCC have identical average E(t) values. A similar situation exists for UUC and NNC. However, considerable difference in average E(t) emerges where N is substituted for U at a level subordinate to a C condition, especially in the most subordinate level. This is most evident in comparing CCN (EðtÞ ¼ :1519) and CCU (EðtÞ ¼ :4151). Moreover, U positioned subordinate to C can undermine an increased collective presence of C, as seen in E(t) for CCU, above, as opposed to CNN (.2887).
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An illustration of the impact of the positioning of the uncertainty condition is provided in Section 5.4 in the form of an organizational example, specifically related to Karasek's (1979) job demand-control model.
Scenario structures clustering together in Tables 3 and 4 can be examined for corresponding coalescence of their E(t) structures. Doing so is facilitated with an available summarizing syntax implementing the current computational structures of E(t) (Morrison et al., 1988; Neufeld, 1999b) . It is potentially instructive to note transitions in these summary expressions across the scenario clusters. A clusterwise listing is presented in Appendix B.
Dissection of uncertainty effects
Simulation results evincing adverse effects of choice condition U on threat reducibility, saliently exacerbated by U's positioning at lower levels of the scenario structure's nesting hierarchy, invite inspection of related formulae. The quantitative workings of the presence of condition U's 'information concealment' are instantiated in structure CUC, over and against CNC; those of U's lower-tier positioning, in turn, are instantiated in NCU over and against UCN.
For CUC,
Hðq 2 1; Ppq 2 2; Ppq 2 i 0 ; q 2 1Þt i 0 ; ð2Þ and for CNC,
HðPq 2 1; Ppq 2 2; Ppq 2 i 0 ; Pq 2 1Þt i 0 :
The value of Pr(t 1 ) is 1/p in each case. As sets of t 1 and Dt i also are shared across the structures, differences in E(t) necessarily emanate from unequal values of Pr(t i 0 ). Values of Pr(t i 0 ) are plotted against i 0 in Figure 1 , for a representative set of parameter values, p ¼ 2, and q ¼ 4, with P varying from 2 to 5. Benefits of pre-disclosure of bin Note. P, p, q coordinates are not given for maximum and minimum E(t) as the coordinates are not singular within scenario structures; see notes to Tables 1 and 2 for definitions of C, U, N, P, p, and q. assignment attending CNC, relative to its absence in CUC, are channelled specifically through a comparatively higher Pr(t i 0) for lower t i 0 values, and vice versa. The following scenario-structure mechanism is responsible for this effect. In the case of CUC, relatively lower values of t i 0 are viable if and only if embedded, bin-set wise, with t 1 (and not in t 1 's bin itself); this restriction does not apply in the case of CNC. Here, release of that contingency, effected through foreknowledge of a non-assignment of t 1 's bin, frees up choice of t i 0 , given its own bin assignment, and competitively low value. Turning to the comparison of scenario structures NCU and UCN, E(t) for NCU is
Hðpq 2 1; Ppq 2 2; Ppq 2 i 0 ; pq 2 1Þ 1 q
where t i 0 is the mean of Ppq 2 1 values of t i 0 . Note that the expression in braces conveys potential encounter of t i 0 , even if it is not the lowest among the pq values of t i 0 in an assigned bin set containing itself, but not t 1 . The probability of engaging such a t i 0 in this case is the complement of the probability of its instead being the lowest, multiplied by the probability of being bin-wise embedded with what actually is the bin set's lowest t i 0 , (q 2 1)/(pq 2 1), in turn along with the probability of its being the assigned element from this element-nesting bin 1/q. All told, by equation (4), t i 0 potentially is engaged, (a) if it is bin-wise embedded with t 1 , which is implemented in first square-bracketed expression in (4); (b) if it is the lowest among the pq values of t i 0 in a bin set not containing t 1 , which is implemented in the expression outside braces in the larger structures illustrating adverse effects of uncertainty U on threat reduction: CUC, denoting free choice over bin sets C, uncertainty of to-be-assigned bin U, and free choice over bin elements C within the assigned bin versus CNC, whose only difference from CUC is no uncertainty of bin assignment N.
square-bracketed expression; and (c) if it is not the lowest of the above pq values of t i 0 , but nevertheless is bin-wise embedded with the lowest of these values, which is implemented in the expression in braces. These mutually exclusive conditions together imply that each t i 0 stands to be engaged, regardless of i 0 . In contrast, in the case of UCN (for which E(t) is given in Table 2 ), by prevailing assumptions, the p 2 1 highest of the Ppq elements t i have no chance of engagement.
A representative plot of Pr(t i 0 ) against i 0 is presented in Figure 2 (P ¼ p ¼ q ¼ 4). As with CUC, as opposed to CNC, the higher E(t) associated with NCU, as opposed to UCN, results from lower Pr(t i 0) attending lower t i 0 values, and vice versa. Moreover, the above asymptote of NCU expresses the inclusive eligibility of t i 0. Roughly, otherwise non-qualifying t i 0 values are endowed with a stochastic 'faint threat', whereby no matter the level of threat, by the current contingencies, an element encounter can nevertheless be released upon the 'stress negotiator'. There continues to be, in other words, a 'lingering uncertainty' imposed by NCU, such that high-threat elements remain (probabilistically) lurking, by sheer dent of embedding among more benign elements (i.e., conditions (a) and (c), above).
Discussion

Inter-attribute associations
Associations between indices of two mathematically and empirically separable stressors (Kukde & Neufeld, 1994; Morrison et al., 1988) were shown by the simulation results to be ubiquitous over decisional-control parameters and structure complexity. structures illustrating adverse effects of positioning of uncertainty U in relation to free choice C on threat reduction: NCU, denoting no uncertainty of to-be-assigned bin set N, free choice over bins C within the assigned bin set, and uncertainty of assigned elements U within each bin; versus UCN, whose only difference from NCU is the interchange of (un)certainty between bin-set and bin-element assignment.
Prevailing threat as a statistic of the environment (cf. Movellan & McClelland, 2001) after maximizing decisional control is 'exogenous to the stress negotiator'; cognitive work is harnessed to expected processing demands endogenous to the DM. Subjective trade-off preferences between these stressors are a candidate source of individual differences in propensity towards decisional control (Morrison et al., 1988; Neufeld, 1999c; Shanahan & Neufeld, 2008) . Formal expressions of cognitive work (Townsend & Ashby, 1978 , 1983 Townsend & Wenger, 2004a , 2004b Wenger & Townsend, 2000 ; see also clinical implementation of Neufeld, Townsend, & Jetté, 2007; and stress significance, Neufeld, 1990 ) present themselves as a cognitive-load translation of the defined scenario structure's information-processing demands OSS. Scanning for a scenario structure's potential encounter of least threat tenably is represented as a dynamical process whose completion is stochastically distributed over time (for mathematical underpinnings, see Townsend & Nozawa, 1995) . Such a process, in turn, can be conceived as comprising constituent operations, or subprocesses, OSS in number. Assuming process latency T is continuously distributed, the amount of cognitive work accomplished by time T is estimable as 2lnð1 2 FðT ÞÞ, where F(T ) is the distribution's cumulative distribution function, or probability of process completion at or before T (Townsend & Ashby, 1983) .
The underlying architecture of the subprocess-dispatching system -notably its serial, parallel (including variants thereof), or hybrid organization of subprocess completion (Townsend & Ashby, 1983 ) -in principle can be identified through contemporary mathematical diagnostics of mental architecture, as applied to process-latency distributions (indeed, as can the exhaustive search implied by a maximizing choice strategy; Townsend & Wenger, 2004b) . Existing empirical latency data bearing on process magnitude is not out of keeping with the current definition of decisional-control processing demands as OSS (Kukde & Neufeld, 1994; Morrison et al., 1988 ; see also below). More fine-grained analysis and associated quantitative signatures of processing architecture, and collateral properties, nevertheless are tenable for characterization of the cognitive load imposed by the present cognition-intensive avenue of coping. In this way, the theoretical prototyping of decisional control potentially dovetails with selected measurement technology of contemporary cognitive science.
The reciprocal relation between the separable stressors varying with decisional control was present for all simulation inputs. The model thus withstood this version of 'model sensitivity analysis', its predicted qualitative patterns of attribute (co)variation being robust across variation in structure-parameter values. It also withstood 'model generalization analysis', in that the parameter landscape spanned by the predicted patterns was extensive, and they withstood the change in hierarchical structure complexity. 2 We now turn our attention to the association between E(t) and its tendered surrogate Pr(t 1 ). Note first that Pr(t 1 ) is immediately tractable, being conceptually and computationally straightforward. Moreover, Pr(t 1 ) is general in that, unlike E(t), it transcends numerical specifics. This index of threat reducibility also is related to the quantitative definition of decisional control by a constant of proportionality, in this way lending construct validity to that definition, and vice versa. Its validity as a gauge of threat reducibility nevertheless also is adjudged by Pr(t 1 )'s association with E(t) as a normative model formal benchmark. Sanguinity is encouraged by E(t)'s scaling, by the complement of Pr(t 1 ), the mean of the complementing set of t i values {t 2 , t 3 , … , t (P)pq } in a subset of the examined structures (Table 2 ; Appendix B). Remaining structures, however, would be expected to perturb this otherwise perfect association, and 'informational completeness' of Pr(t 1 ). The simulations indicate a 'high moderate' average association between Pr(t 1 ) and E(t). However, they also signal that confidence in Pr(t 1 ) as a substitute for E(t) is justified in certain parameter regions more than others. Given the scalar impact of threat levels confirmed in the analyses, bivariate correlation values between Pr(t 1 ), E(t), and OSS can be determined independent of levels of (equally spaced) element-wise threat. Authoritative tables reporting degree of association between these quantities for given p, q pairs and P, p, q triplets can be consulted for regions of specific interest (available in supporting online materials, http://publish. uwo.ca/~mshanah).
Candidate sources of individual differences in propensity towards decisional control
The quantified decisional-control structure attributes Pr(t 1 ) and OSS, and their documented positive relation across structures, usher in an integration with selected formal models of preference and choice befitting this very structure composition (e.g., Tversky's EBA, 1972a , 1972b Batsell et al., 2003 ; see also Busemeyer, Forsyth, & Nozawa, 1988; Saari, 2005) . 3 Made available in principle are estimated subjective utilities of reduction in each constituent stressor, and description and prediction of preference behaviours regarding structures in which the stressors are embedded (Morrison et al., 1988) . Fostering this integration, developments presented here have ascertained the generality of the above positive relation -also known as 'incompatibility of criteria' (Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Russo, 1969 ) -across both structure parameters and complexity.
A tenable source of individual differences in subjective trade-off of the separable stressors is differential facility with cognitive functions subserving decisional-control's requisite predictive judgements ('cognitive measurement technology', above). Alongside is differential susceptibility to adverse effects of stress itself, on efficiency of such functions, as they take place in stressing environments (Neufeld, 1994 (Neufeld, , 1999a Neufeld & McCarty, 1994; Neufeld et al., 2007 ; see also Ferguson, 2004; Ferguson & Bibby, 2002) . Pursuant to individual-difference extremes, the present developments offer a formal platform for the potential analysis of compromised stress resolution associated with cognitive deficit in clinical disorders, such as schizophrenia (e.g., Neufeld, 2007; Townsend & Neufeld, 2010; cf. Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993 ). 
Choosing into uncertainty
A marked feature of the across-structure configuration of threat expectation is the undermining of threat attenuation through strategic choice, when condition U is located in subordinate positions of a hierarchy structure. Following a sequence of empirical studies incorporating behavioural and psychophysiological measures of stress activation, Paterson and Neufeld (1995) observed that heightened evidence of stress was identified with conditions of 'blind selection' and increased information-processing load under time pressure. Tendered here are quantitative mechanisms highly coherent with these observations: under the above circumstances of condition U, lower threat encounters have a demonstrably reduced probability of occurrence, and the opposite for higher threat encounters; moreover, there can remain a residual viability of a scenario structure's elements of highest threat (Figure 2 ). Such intersection with experimental results illustrates how quantitative normative models of stress and coping may coalesce with empirical findings, in the service of validating the first and explaining the second.
Relations to allied modelling
The present developments convey prototypes of decisional-control transactions, falling into the category of a quasi-stochastic static model -Pr(t i ), t i , and E(t) are probabilistic, but RSS and OSS are deterministic (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) . Upon encountering natural or laboratory instantiations, individuals are apt to array themselves in terms of differential predilection to decisional-control opportunities, according to facility with requisite cognitive functions and personality traits. Moreover, individual dispositions may realign upon repeated encounters; proficiency in requisite cognitive functions may increase, as may propensity to engage in available decisional control with cumulative experiences of its threat-reducing pay-off.
Modelling addressed to other game-related domains entailing risky, uncertain choice, notably that of altruism and public goods provision, on the other hand has addressed dynamical changes and individual differences (e.g., Anderson, Goeree, & Holt, 1998; Itaya & Shimomura, 2001) . Models of this nature may productively inform future developments of the form of modelling presented in this paper.
Certain nonlinear dynamical systems ('chaos-theoretic') modelling meanwhile has expressly invoked, as an 'order dimension', decisional-control coping, whose continuous dynamics, along with those of collateral variables (e.g., cognitive proficiency and engagement propensity) are expressed in terms of coupled differential equations (Neufeld, 1999a) . Moreover, emergent discontinuous dynamics comprise system transmogrification, occurring to continuous system-parameter changes (Levy et al., 2010; Levy, Yao, Vollick, McGuire, & Neufeld, 2006; Yao et al., 2006) . Unlike the case with dynamic linear public goods games, however, although part and parcel of a quantitative dynamical system, decisional control here does not have formal dynamics interwoven into its game-like structure itself.
The present developments also depart from other related formulations, in compliance with certain sui generis stress-and-coping exigencies. Decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) , for example, addresses choice alternatives composed of probabilities of varying financial pay-offs, and is fully stochastic (see also Birnbaum, 2008; Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005) . Also, contra these formulations, the present developments stress the intrinsically reciprocal relations between posited 'commodities', threat reduction, and reduction in cognitive load.
The formal systematization of the relations between threat reduction and cognitive load allows for a new opportunity to instantiate a transactional approach to stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . A transactional approach highlights the mutual influence of DM and environment, in an iterative format, wherein the exercise of decisional control at time 1 alters the threat statistics of the environment for the exercise of decisional control at time 2. This Markov chain-type concatenation of decisional scenarios would incorporate the intransigent formal relations of the relevant decisionalcontrol situational attributes, while allowing for the specific values to be dynamically influenced by previous choices. If a specific progression of numerous threat-reducing decisions were considered a dynamic process (as per Lazarus & Folkman, 1984 ), the present model allows for the attribute values generated for each self-contained 'decision cell' to have a high degree of formal integrity, strengthening the validity of simulations of transactional stress processes.
Whereas Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) theory of cognitive appraisal includes an emotional component in the perception of stress, they refer to Janis and Mann (1977) as developing a more purely cognitive approach to stress resolution through evaluation of courses of action. Our model is in this vein, and provides a normative basis from which to assess any particular DM's efficacy in enacting available decisional control for stress reduction. For example, suppose a dedicated shift manager is promoted to a new level of responsibility within a factory, and is now responsible for safety in the entire plant. The decision-making efficiency of this individual is now more critical. The set of heuristics that are suitable for a shift manager may not be optimal for a director of plant safety. One avenue indicated by our model might be to assess whether the DM is aware of the general efficiency of the heuristic of probability of access to the least threatening option as an index of threat reducibility. The DM could be trained to spot this configuration in various scenarios the employees face in the plant, and increase this value by decreasing the set size at nodes with constraints on choice. The new safety director could be assessed for the degree to which he or she can evaluate the optimal stress-reduction structure to give employees and assessed for the concomitant skill of normative threat negotiation in a given scenario. A particular application of this training could be that if workers are to be given free choice of shift but externally assigned what product to make on a given shift (scenario structure CN), minimizing the number of possible product assignments (min q) will most likely maximize the worker's ability to negotiate their risk of injury, job stress level, or general aversiveness of their work ðEðtÞ / Prðt 1 Þ; Prðt 1 Þ ¼ 1=q). A further benefit would be that individual workers, in exercising decisional control along individual differences patterns, may have differing evaluations of the aversiveness or very general 'threat level' of a given assignment, thus ensuring some distribution of labour across a variety of tasks by allowing individual predilection some scope of action in decision making.
The job demand-control model (Karasek, 1979 ) uses a stress and coping approach in the workplace and introduced the notion of job strain as the combination of high job demands and low job decision latitude. There is an interesting relation between the positional effect of uncertainty within a decision hierarchy in our model and the approach to assessing job decision latitude as defined by Karasek. Consonant with Karasek, our model supports the idea that low decision latitude will hamper threat reduction by limiting available decisional control. Further to this observation, however, when mixed decisional structures (some choice, some external assignment) within an organization are set up in a framework such as UC, for example, considerable advantage may accrue to individual employees when it comes to objective threat-reduction capabilities, over a CU arrangement. Conversely, some job decision latitude, although appearing to be devolving stress negotiation to a local DM, may be largely illusory in the threat-reduction opportunity it confers. Overall, however, any degree of choice is superior to pure external assignment (N or U conditions only).
A final comment on this application of the model deals with underlying assumptions. While the U and N assignments are assumed to be random, there is a way in which external assignment in practice would imitate this, and a way in which it would not. Random assignment is a valid assumption to the extent that employees are treated like a capital resource, the assignment of whom (of employee to task, nested in task location, for example), is independent of the employee's own considerations. Thus the external assignment is 'blind' to the employee's threat-reduction aims. On the other hand, the random assignment assumption becomes weaker to the extent that management of morale, employee preference, and individual ability profile is incorporated in decision making. Nonetheless, assuming that the DM (employee or other self-motivated agent) is ensuring their own welfare, while the external assignment is done for considerations largely apart from the DM's threat reduction, the assumption of equal probability of assignment within N or U conditions is tenable.
Empirical touchstones and further research
Formal models of stress and coping may be used to test theory according to their analytic derivations and collateral computer computations. As indicated throughout, they also prescribe empirical observations. Below, we highlight the explanatory power of the model in predicting empirical response patterns in data collected with psychophysiological and behavioural measures. We go on to suggest a broader scope for further principled investigation in decision-making science, specifically within the learned helplessness paradigm (Seligman, 1975) and with respect to the quantitative assessment of individual differences in disposition to implement decisional control. Most broadly, the decision-making paradigms of maximizing (Janis & Mann, 1977) and satisficing (Simon, 1955) may be profitably rounded out to include 'simplifying' (cf. Paquette & Kida, 1988; Wright, 1975) , wherein DM-driven artificial relinquishment of information-processing and decision-making demands is prized most highly, at the cost of accepting an event-occurrence threat level that is fully externally driven.
The formally educed structure of decisional control stipulates that designated measures can selectively track its quantified properties, of adverse-event threat and information-processing demands. Such measures include, for example, facial electromyography (EMG). Lip and chin (orbicularis oris and digastricus) myoactivity are deemed as sensitive and specific to covert information processing, while forehead ( frontalis) EMG is held to selectively indicate subjective threat of adverse-event occurrence (reviewed in Kukde & Neufeld, 1994) . These measures therefore should vary in opposite directions across conditions of experimental stress varying in availability of decisional control.
Such fractionation is presented in Figure 3 , for a subset of first-order pairs of choice conditions. Participants were presented with two sets of alphabetic letters, under choice conditions C or N governing selection possibilities of letter sets, combined with conditions C, U, or N governing selection possibilities of letters nested within sets. Facial EMG, displayed in the figure, was obtained while participants selected an available letter, which according to preliminary rounds of probability learning (see segment on unpredictability in the supplementary online document), was associated with minimal likelihood of an adverse event (a burst of safe but aversive white noise; full details are available in Kukde & Neufeld, 1994) .
The contour of response latencies, presented in Figure 4 , also essentially conforms to model expectations across the combinations of choice conditions. As well, the direction of intra-trial subjectively reported stress (accompanied by skin-conductance and cardiac measures) paralleled that of lip and chin EMG, while that of adverse-event probability, previously paired with the selected letter, resembled the path of forehead EMG (all generally replicating findings previously reported in Morrison et al., 1988) .
These results illustrate how formal developments can give rise to experimental paradigms and empirical predictions. The subset of choice conditions in the present example was limited according to laboratory constraints. However, other feasible subsets from the current set of 9 first-order or 27 second-order combinations of choice conditions, along with any number of values for P, p, and q, are available for similar experimental implementation.
Predictions concerning other measurement fractionations also are available. Signatures of experienced threat versus challenge have been derived from cardiac and vascular response patterns (Blascovich, 2008) . Placing a premium on threat reduction, over and against cognitive-load reduction, based on individualized parameters of formal preference-choice models (Sections 1 and 5.2) is predicted to be positively associated with evidence of challenge versus threat (Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & Weisbuch, 2004 ) -specifically where choice conditions afford increased decisional control (currently under study in our laboratory).
Developments presented here provide substantial numerical-point values from an expansive charting of scenario parameters, and decisional-control property interrelations, affording considerable fodder for empirical predictions. They also throw light on existing findings (cf. Haig, 2008 ) from laboratory (e.g., Paterson & Neufeld, 1995) and field settings (Wells & Matthews, 1994) .
Additional empirical predictions bear on barriers to threat reducibility stemming from the introduction and positioning of uncertainty U. Choice condition combinations predicted to generate increased evidence of adverse-event threat, as compared to more uncertainty-benign conditions, are specified in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Forehead (frontalis) Figure 3 . Facial EMG activity across a subset of first-order combinations of decisional-control choice conditions. Letter pairs on the abscissa indicate choice condition over letter sets, choice condition over letters nested within sets; C, free choice over constituents; N, no uncertainty as to constituent assignment; U, uncertainty of to-be-assigned constituent. Values for lip and forehead EMG are collapsed over two versus four letters per each of two-letter sets, for each pair of choice conditions, and across the first versus second (randomly interspersed) trial of each of the 12 (6 £ 2) combinations of choice conditions and letter-set size; those for chin EMG are for the first trial of the two-letter set size presentations (adapted from Kukde & Neufeld, 1994) .
A novel prediction on a broader scale can include the application of the positioning effect of uncertainty U to the learned helplessness paradigm (Seligman, 1975) . The learned helplessness paradigm describes how an organism can learn that there are no actions that will reduce the threat statistics of their environment. However, this learning becomes overgeneralized, and is incorrectly applied to negate the potential of action in one's circumstances to improve one's lot in terms of ambient threat. One of the 'actions' which may unfortunately be curtailed is the cognitive exercise of decisional control. Thus, individuals may generalize from previous experience that most situations are, in the terms of this model, NN or UU -fully externally determined, when they may not be. In a more subtle way, there may even be some form of partial helplessness discouragement if an individual is in a C-with-subordinate-U situation, wherein apparent advantage due to C is in fact somewhat or even mostly illusory, due to a subordinate U. Individuals with depression are among Seligman's principal groups of interest for application of learned helplessness. Such a person may generate considerable self-reproach, or experience reproach from others, for not improving his or her . Response latencies to letter selection across a subset of first-order combinations of decisional-control choice conditions, for each combination of choice conditions and element-set size q, separately for the first and second (randomly-interspersed) trial of the 12 (6 £ 2) combinations of choice conditions and set size. Upper-case letter pairs on the abscissa correspond to those described in Figure 3 (adapted from Kukde & Neufeld, 1994) .
situation through decision and action. However, if the decisional and informational structure of the situation is such that previous attempts at coping have been made within decisional scenarios with little or no objective opportunity for threat reduction, the 'learned helplessness' of such an individual is quite legitimate. Further and more comprehensive mapping of how to structure decisional scenarios within individual lives to foster the opposite of learned helplessness (e.g., 'optimism' or 'resilience' in Reivich, Gillham, Chaplin, & Seligman, 2005; 'personal agency' in Bandura, 2006) stand to be informed by this model's quantification of decisional-control's threat-reducing efficacy. Following the reasoning of the application of decisional control to a learned helplessness paradigm, the individual differences in predilection to exercise decisional control are quite relevant to explore with a view to adding an instrument or two to the toolbox of personality measurement in psychology. Specifically, the potential exists to artificially move from a scenario with free choice C, for example CN, to an NN scenario by simply making a random selection where free choice is available. The pay-off is reduced information-processing demand. For individuals with emotional distress and/or cognitive impairment, this may become the strategy of choice. This type of decisionmaking strategy, placed on a spectrum from maximizing (exhaustive search for maximum benefit), through satisficing (search sufficient for tangible advantage), may be termed simplifying (no search and acceptance of ambient environmental threat statistics, in return for escaping the cognitive demands of negotiating threat reduction).
Concluding comments
The current game-like formulation of decisional control comprises a normative theoretical model of environmental exigencies underlying reduction in threat of adverse events. As with normative models generally, it affords a template of statistically optimal behaviours ('maximizing' decision and choice strategies) against which descriptive models (Edwards, 1988; Over, 2004) in principle can be fashioned and/or selected, and from which the nature and degree of descriptive-model departure can be ascertained (e.g., Maddox & Filoteo, 2007; Neufeld et al., 2007) .
Heuristic assets include predictions of responses tracking quantitatively dissociable sources of stress activation. They also include: delineation of psychometrically measurable individual differences in response patterns, and sources of such differences associated with decisional control implementing cognitive faculties, and with susceptibility to stress effects on cognitive efficiency; connections to formal models of decision and choice dovetailing with the structure of decisional-control attributes, and predicting differential preference for decisional-control coping, and realization of its advantages; and connections to complementing forms of formal modelling of stress-and decisional-control-based coping, notably those of nonlinear dynamical systems theory. Delineated are exacerbating effects, on compromised threat reducibility, of subordinate locations of outcome uncertainty within systematically constructed hierarchical scenario structures. Also brought into play are situation properties potentially significant for psychological stress that bear on adverse-event predictability (eventvariance considerations).
The amalgam of analytic and simulation developments may serve as a prototype for extensions transcending the present assumptive framework. Such extensions invite similar quantitative conversions of verbal axioms for discerning networks of stresscoping attributes. Table 4 . b E(min x t i ) is the expected value of the minimum of a random sample of x t i outcomes. c E(min x t i 0 ) is the expected value of the minimum of a random sample of x t i 0 outcomes. d The term t i 0 denotes the mean of Ppq 2 1 values of t i 0 . e Elaboration upon terms in this set of expressions is available according to the latter's full computational formulae, as presented for CNU in Table 2 , and for NCU in equation (4) and its related prose, of the text.
